Abstract
In the case of Vardnikov vs. Alovitch, the Tel-Aviv District Court has assumed that leveraged buyouts are a symptom of centralized markets, and are suspect to be an additional form of tunneling in which owners squeeze out value from the firm. As a consequence, the court has imposed the Enhanced Business Judgment Rule on such transactions. In this Article, I argue to the contrary: not only that leverage buyouts are not a negative symptom of centralized markets, they actually curtail market centralization by enabling the expansion of the number of potential owners. As a consequence, leveraged buyouts should not be treated by courts suspiciously and should be reviewed under the more lenient Business Judgment Rule.
Translated title of the contribution | Leveraged Buyouts: : A Symptom of a Centralized Market or Means for Minimizing Centralization? |
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Original language | Hebrew |
Pages (from-to) | 293-317 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | מחקרי משפט |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 1 |
State | Published - 2017 |
IHP Publications
- ihp
- Conflict of interests
- Corporate governance
- Corporation law
- Decentralization in management
- Dividends
- Executives
- Financial leverage
- Judicial review
- ביקורת שיפוטית
- דיני חברות
- חלוקת רווחים
- מנוף פיננסי
- נושאי משרה בחברות
- ניגוד עניינים
- ריכוז וביזור
- רכישה ומכירה של חברות
- רכישה ממונפת
- שליטה (חברות)