Level r consensus and stable social choice

Muhammad Mahajne, Shmuel Nitzan, Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r consensus around a given preference relation, there exists a Condorcet winner. In addition, if the number of individuals is odd the majority relation coincides with the preference relation around which there is such consensus and consequently it is transitive. Furthermore, if the level of consensus is sufficiently strong, the Condorcet winner is chosen by all the scoring rules. Level r consensus therefore ensures the Condorcet consistency of all scoring rules, thus eliminating the tension between decision rules inspired by ranking-based utilitarianism and the majority rule.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)805-817
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.


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