Lenient Policy Proposal for the Struggle Against Illegal Immigration

Nava Kahana, Tikva Lecker

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


    Policy strategies directed against illegal immigration have largely concentrated on border and domestic enforcement. This paper suggests that host countries could consider a more lenient approach: contributing to the deportation cost of self-reporting illegal immigrants. The increase in illegal immigration that such a reward might bring about is shown to be more than offset by the rise in the number of self-reporting illegal immigrants leaving the rich country, with a concomitant decrease in the number of remaining illegal immigrants. An added advantage of this policy is that the self-reporting immigrants would be predominantly the relatively lower socio-economic group. When adopting this policy, the rich country must choose the appropriate mix of two policy means: funds allocated to strengthening its border and domestic control; and rewards to self-reporting illegal immigrants.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity
    EditorsSolomon Polachek, Carmel Chiswick, Hillel Rapoport
    Number of pages9
    StatePublished - 2006

    Publication series

    NameResearch in Labor Economics
    ISSN (Print)0147-9121


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