TY - GEN

T1 - Leakage-resilient cryptography from minimal assumptions

AU - Hazay, Carmit

AU - López-Alt, Adriana

AU - Wee, Hoeteck

AU - Wichs, Daniel

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - We present new constructions of leakage-resilient cryptosystems, which remain provably secure even if the attacker learns some arbitrary partial information about their internal secret key. For any polynomial ℓ, we can instantiate these schemes so as to tolerate up to ℓ bits of leakage. While there has been much prior work constructing such leakage-resilient cryptosystems under concrete number-theoretic and algebraic assumptions, we present the first schemes under general and minimal assumptions. In particular, we construct: - Leakage-resilient public-key encryption from any standard public-key encryption. - Leakage-resilient weak pseudorandom functions, symmetric-key encryption, and message-authentication codes from any one-way function. These are the first constructions of leakage-resilient symmetric-key primitives that do not rely on public-key assumptions. We also get the first constructions of leakage-resilient public-key encryption from "search assumptions", such as the hardness of factoring or CDH. Although our schemes can tolerate arbitrarily large amounts of leakage, the tolerated rate of leakage (defined as the ratio of leakage-amount to key-size) is rather poor in comparison to prior results under specific assumptions. As a building block of independent interest, we study a notion of weak hash-proof systems in the public-key and symmetric-key settings. While these inherit some of the interesting security properties of standard hash-proof systems, we can instantiate them under general assumptions.

AB - We present new constructions of leakage-resilient cryptosystems, which remain provably secure even if the attacker learns some arbitrary partial information about their internal secret key. For any polynomial ℓ, we can instantiate these schemes so as to tolerate up to ℓ bits of leakage. While there has been much prior work constructing such leakage-resilient cryptosystems under concrete number-theoretic and algebraic assumptions, we present the first schemes under general and minimal assumptions. In particular, we construct: - Leakage-resilient public-key encryption from any standard public-key encryption. - Leakage-resilient weak pseudorandom functions, symmetric-key encryption, and message-authentication codes from any one-way function. These are the first constructions of leakage-resilient symmetric-key primitives that do not rely on public-key assumptions. We also get the first constructions of leakage-resilient public-key encryption from "search assumptions", such as the hardness of factoring or CDH. Although our schemes can tolerate arbitrarily large amounts of leakage, the tolerated rate of leakage (defined as the ratio of leakage-amount to key-size) is rather poor in comparison to prior results under specific assumptions. As a building block of independent interest, we study a notion of weak hash-proof systems in the public-key and symmetric-key settings. While these inherit some of the interesting security properties of standard hash-proof systems, we can instantiate them under general assumptions.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84883335633&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_10

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_10

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AN - SCOPUS:84883335633

SN - 9783642383472

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 160

EP - 176

BT - Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 2013 - 32nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings

T2 - 32nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2013

Y2 - 26 May 2013 through 30 May 2013

ER -