TY - JOUR
T1 - Language, meaning, and games
T2 - A model of communication, coordination, and evolution: Comment
AU - Heller, Yuval
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2014/6
Y1 - 2014/6
N2 - Demichelis and Weibull (2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.
AB - Demichelis and Weibull (2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904437948&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
DO - 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
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SN - 0002-8282
VL - 104
SP - 1857
EP - 1863
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 6
ER -