Keeping denial-of-service attackers in the dark

Gal Badishi, Amir Herzberg, Idit Keidar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

18 Scopus citations


We consider the problem of overcoming (Distributed) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by realistic adversaries that can eavesdrop on messages, or parts thereof, but with some delay. We show a protocol that mitigates DoS attacks by eavesdropping adversaries, using only available, efficient packet filtering mechanisms based mainly on (addresses and) port numbers. Our protocol avoids the use of fixed ports, and instead performs 'pseudo-random port hopping'. We model the underlying packet-filtering services and define measures for the capabilities of the adversary and for the success rate of the protocol. Using these, we analyze the proposed protocol, and show that it provides effective DoS prevention for realistic attack and deployment scenarios.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDistributed Computing - 19th International Conference, DISC 2005, Proceedings
Number of pages15
StatePublished - 2005
Event19th International Conference on Distributed Computing, DISC 2005 - Cracow, Poland
Duration: 26 Sep 200529 Sep 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3724 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference19th International Conference on Distributed Computing, DISC 2005


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