Cryptographic hardware becomes increasingly vulnerable to physical attacks—both passive side-channel analysis and active fault injections—performed by skillful and well-equipped adversaries. In this paper, we introduce a technique that provides very high security against both types of attacks. It combines inner product masking (IPM), which offers higher-order side-channel attack resistance on word level and on bit level, with nonlinear security-oriented error-detection codes that provide robustness, i.e., strong detection guarantees for arbitrary faults. We prove that our scheme has the same security against side-channel attacks that an earlier, non-robust IPM-based solution has and in addition preserves robustness during addition and multiplication (and therefore arbitrary computations). Moreover, we prove that the information leakage from the checker is small and that the attack will be detected far before the attacker will gain significant information.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Parts of this paper were presented at the Proceedings of 8th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems, PROOFS 2019 . This research was supported by the ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (Grant No. 923/16) and by the DFG (German Research Foundation) Project Po 1220/7-2 “Algebraic Fault Attacks” .
© 2020, The Author(s).