Intuitive and reflective inferences

Hugo Mercier, Dan Sperber

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter proposes a principled distinction between two types of inferences: 'intuitive' and 'reflective' (or reasoning proper). It grounds this distinction in a modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. The chapter defends the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication rather than to help individual ratiocination. This function, it claims, helps explain important aspects of reasoning. The discussion reviews some of the existing evidence and argues that it gives support to this approach.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIn Two Minds
Subtitle of host publicationDual Processes and Beyond
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191696442
ISBN (Print)9780199230167
DOIs
StatePublished - 22 Mar 2012
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Oxford University Press, 2009. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Dual-system theories
  • Human psychological evolution
  • Interpersonal communication
  • Reasoning

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