Abstract
Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We find that if a contest is sufficiently "hard" for a group, the answers to these questions are positive under plausible conditions. In such situations, monopoly of the private stake is most effective in enhancing the group's performance. Ironically, in the same cases, the welfare of many group members would be negatively related to the size of their individual stake.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 219-238 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2014 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department at Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged by Shmuel Nitzan. Kaoru Ueda is grateful for the funding by the Nitto Foundation, Aichi.
Funding
Financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department at Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged by Shmuel Nitzan. Kaoru Ueda is grateful for the funding by the Nitto Foundation, Aichi.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Adar Foundation of the Economics Department at Bar-Ilan University | |
| Nitto Foundation | |
| Shmuel Nitzan |