International tax policy: Between competition and cooperation

Tsilly Dagan

Research output: Book/ReportBookpeer-review

34 Scopus citations

Abstract

Bringing a unique voice to international taxation, this book argues against the conventional support of multilateral co-operation in favour of structured competition as a way to promote both justice and efficiency in international tax policy. Tsilly Dagan analyses international taxation as a decentralised market, where governments have increasingly become strategic actors. While many of the challenges of the current international tax regime derive from this decentralised competitive structure, Dagan argues that curtailing competition through centralisation is not necessarily the answer. Conversely, competition - if properly calibrated and notwithstanding its dubious reputation - is conducive, rather than detrimental, to both efficiency and global justice. International Tax Policy begins with the basic normative goals of income taxation, explaining how competition transforms them and analysing the strategic game states play on the bilateral and multilateral level. It then considers the costs and benefits of co-operation and competition in terms of efficiency and justice. A non-technical account of tax policy in an increasingly globalised era appealing to those interested in international tax law and related issues. A theoretical analysis of international tax policy that provides a necessary foundation for current debates on substantial changes in international tax policy. Offers an integrated multidisciplinary framework for evaluating competing international tax regimes in a global setting.

Original languageEnglish
PublisherCambridge University Press
Number of pages260
ISBN (Electronic)9781316282496
ISBN (Print)9781107112100
DOIs
StatePublished - 14 Dec 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Tsilly Dagan 2018. All rights reserved.

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