Institutional Investor Impact on the Outcome of Freezeout Offers

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review


We study institutional investors' impact on going private tender offers by controlling shareholders ("freezeout" offers) because these are occasions where engagement-restraining considerations such as keeping the long term relations with the firm are less relevant. Further, we examine data from Israel, where regulation over freezeout offers is loose and where (consequently?) about half of the offers are rejected. We find that in accepted offers, the offer premium increases with institutional investor holdings. Institutional ownership also increases the likelihood that the offer is rejected. However, in rejected offers, institutional investors do not appear to add to public value. This complex evidence is consistent with institutional investors acting as strategic bargaining agents.
Original languageAmerican English
StatePublished - 2017
EventRaymond Ackerman International CG Conference - , Israel
Duration: 10 Dec 201711 Dec 2017


ConferenceRaymond Ackerman International CG Conference


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