Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition

Eyal Kushilevitz; Yehuda Lindell; Tal Rabin

doi:10.1145/1132516.1132532

Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition

Eyal Kushilevitz, Yehuda Lindell, Tal Rabin

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies security under concurrent composition, This question is motivated by the folklore that all known protocols that are secure in the informationtheoretic setting are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security of protocols under composition while considering only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	STOC'06
Subtitle of host publication	Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages	109-118
Number of pages	10
ISBN (Print)	1595931341, 9781595931344
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1132516.1132532
State	Published - 2006
Event	38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06 - Seattle, WA, United States Duration: 21 May 2006 → 23 May 2006

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
Volume	2006
ISSN (Print)	0737-8017

Conference

Conference	38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06
Country/Territory	United States
City	Seattle, WA
Period	21/05/06 → 23/05/06

Keywords

Information-theoretic security
Protocol composition
Secure computation
Theory of cryptography

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10.1145/1132516.1132532

Cite this

Kushilevitz, E., Lindell, Y., & Rabin, T. (2006). Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition. In STOC'06: Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (pp. 109-118). (Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing; Vol. 2006). Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). https://doi.org/10.1145/1132516.1132532

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Kushilevitz, E, Lindell, Y & Rabin, T 2006, Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition. in STOC'06: Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, vol. 2006, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), pp. 109-118, 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06, Seattle, WA, United States, 21/05/06. https://doi.org/10.1145/1132516.1132532

Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition. / Kushilevitz, Eyal; Lindell, Yehuda; Rabin, Tal.
STOC'06: Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2006. p. 109-118 (Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing; Vol. 2006).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition

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