Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition

Eyal Kushilevitz, Yehuda Lindell, Tal Rabin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

15 Scopus citations


We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies security under concurrent composition, This question is motivated by the folklore that all known protocols that are secure in the informationtheoretic setting are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security of protocols under composition while considering only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSTOC'06
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)1595931341, 9781595931344
StatePublished - 2006
Event38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06 - Seattle, WA, United States
Duration: 21 May 200623 May 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
ISSN (Print)0737-8017


Conference38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySeattle, WA


  • Information-theoretic security
  • Protocol composition
  • Secure computation
  • Theory of cryptography


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