Information leakage from robust codes protecting cryptographic primitives

Osnat Keren, Ilia Polian

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


Cryptographic hardware primitives are subject to fault injection attacks. Security-oriented codes are considered the most powerful technique for detecting such attacks. They provide (probabilistic) guarantees for the detection of maliciously injected faults even under the assumption of a sophisticated attacker with access to powerful equipment. In this chapter, we revisit the earlier finding that error-detection infrastructure may increase the undesired information leakage. It is shown that the probability of an attack to be undetected by the best robust codes known today is exponentially smaller than the entropy loss due to information leak from the checker. This means that an attack will be detected far before the attacker can acquire significant information. The analysis is constrictive; given a bound for acceptable information leakage, it allows the designer to easily choose the number of redundant bits required to detect the attack before this bound is reached.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFrontiers in Hardware Security and Trust
PublisherInstitution of Engineering and Technology
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781785619274
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2021.


  • Codes
  • Cryptographic hardware primitive protection
  • Cryptography
  • Cryptography
  • Cryptography theory
  • Data security
  • Entropy loss
  • Error detection codes
  • Error-detection infrastructure
  • Fault diagnosis
  • Information leakage
  • Maliciously injected fault attacks
  • Other topics in statistics
  • Other topics in statistics
  • Probability
  • Robust codes
  • Security-oriented codes


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