Incremental Negotiation and Coalition Formation for Resource-bounded Agents Preliminary report

Charles L. Ortiz, Eric Hsu, Marie desJardins, Timothy Rauenbusch, Barbara Grosz, Osher Yadgar, Sarit Kraus

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Weexplore a class of task allocation mechanismsthat are incremental and can be tuned to the computational resource limitations of agents. Our focus is on distributed task and resource allocation problemsinvolving coalitions of cooperativeagents that mustnegotiate amongthemselves on the distribution of tasks. Our emphasis is on the design of mechanismswith desirable real-time and dynamicproperties. Wedescribe preliminary workin four areas: the design of what we call time-bounded commitmentnetworks that are extensions of task-auctions and contract nets and that support a notion of reciprocal commitment;anytime algorithms for combinatorialtask allocation that take into account both positive and negative task interactions, organizationalframeworks for efficient task allocation in highly dynamicdomainsinvolving hundreds of agents, and logical tools for analyzingdynamicemergent properties of agent societies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages53-62
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2001
Event2001 AAAI Fall Symposium - North Falmouth, United States
Duration: 2 Nov 20014 Nov 2001

Conference

Conference2001 AAAI Fall Symposium
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNorth Falmouth
Period2/11/014/11/01

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2001 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.

Funding

Acknowledgments This research was funded by DARPAC ontract F30602-99-C-0169 under the Autonomous Negotiating Teams (ANTS) Program.

FundersFunder number
DARPACF30602-99-C-0169

    Keywords

    • Negotiation
    • multiagent systems
    • real-time resource allocation

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