Abstract
Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position that aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. Non-Causal Libertarianism has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent's control over her action, and, therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have even gone so far as to claim that NCL does not offer a plausible account of action. This paper is intended to defend NCL against these charges. It addresses specifically, The Disappearing Agent Objection, Peter van Inwagen's Mind Argument, and some objections by Randolph Clarke.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-14 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 55 |
Issue number | 1 |
State | Published - Jan 2018 |
Bibliographical note
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