In defense of non-causal Libert arianism

David Widerker

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position that aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. Non-Causal Libertarianism has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent's control over her action, and, therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have even gone so far as to claim that NCL does not offer a plausible account of action. This paper is intended to defend NCL against these charges. It addresses specifically, The Disappearing Agent Objection, Peter van Inwagen's Mind Argument, and some objections by Randolph Clarke.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-14
Number of pages14
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume55
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

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