Imaginatively-Colored Perception: Walton on Pictorial Experience

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This paper develops Kendall Walton's account of pictorial experience. Walton argues that the key feature of that experience is that it is imaginatively-penetrated experience. I argue that this idea, as put forward by Walton, has various shortcomings. After discussing these limitations, I suggest, on the basis of a more general phenomenon of cognitive penetration, a refinement of Walton's account. I then show how the revised account explains various features of pictorial experience. Specifically, I show that, given the manner in which imaginings influence perceptual experience, Walton can dispense with the thesis that pictorial experience is twofold.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-47
Number of pages21
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 The University of Memphis.


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