Abstract
This article offers an innovative argument, according to which
courts do not interpret human dignity according to an abstract theoretical position on the nature of the value only, nor subordinate themselves to the subjective purpose of the drafters of a constitution. Thus,
courts-whether in the United States, where human dignity is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, or in countries where the right
is constitutionally enshrined, such as Germany, South Africa, and Israel-interpret and apply human dignity on the basis of the entirety of
the provisions of the particular constitution. Human dignity serves as
a constitutional chameleon in the sense that courts interpret it in accordance with the constitutional environment in which human dignity
is located.
courts do not interpret human dignity according to an abstract theoretical position on the nature of the value only, nor subordinate themselves to the subjective purpose of the drafters of a constitution. Thus,
courts-whether in the United States, where human dignity is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, or in countries where the right
is constitutionally enshrined, such as Germany, South Africa, and Israel-interpret and apply human dignity on the basis of the entirety of
the provisions of the particular constitution. Human dignity serves as
a constitutional chameleon in the sense that courts interpret it in accordance with the constitutional environment in which human dignity
is located.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 739-772 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review |
| Volume | 5 |
| State | Published - 2022 |