How to construct a leakage-resilient (stateless) trusted party

Daniel Genkin, Yuval Ishai, Mor Weiss

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations


Trusted parties and devices are commonly used in the real world to securely perform computations on secret inputs. However, their security can often be compromised by side-channel attacks in which the adversary obtains partial leakage on intermediate computation values. This gives rise to the following natural question: To what extent can one protect the trusted party against leakage? Our goal is to design a hardware device T that allows m≥ 1 parties to securely evaluate a function f(x1, …, xm) of their inputs by feeding T with encoded inputs that are obtained using local secret randomness. Security should hold even in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt a subset of parties and obtain restricted leakage on the internal computations in T. We design hardware devices T in this setting both for zero-knowledge proofs and for general multi-party computations. Our constructions can unconditionally resist either AC0 leakage or a strong form of “only computation leaks” (OCL) leakage that captures realistic side-channel attacks, providing different tradeoffs between efficiency and security.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 15th International Conference, TCC 2017, Proceedings
EditorsYael Kalai, Leonid Reyzin
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages36
ISBN (Print)9783319705026
StatePublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event15th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2017 - Baltimore, United States
Duration: 12 Nov 201715 Nov 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10678 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference15th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, International Association for Cryptologic Research.


  • AMD Circuits
  • Algebraic manipulation detection
  • Leakage-resilience
  • Secure multiparty computation


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