How Judgments of Visual Resemblance are Induced by Visual Experience

Alon Chasid, Alik Pelman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Judgments of visual resemblance (‘A looks like B’), unlike other judgments of resemblance, are often induced directly by visual experience. What is the nature of this experience? We argue that the visual experience that prompts a subject looking at A to judge that A looks like B is a visual experience of B. After elucidating this thesis, we defend it, using the ‘phenomenal contrast’ method. Comparing our account to competing accounts, we show that the phenomenal contrast between a visual experience that induces the judgment that A looks like B, and a visual experience that does not induce this judgment, is best explained by the fact that the former visually represents B, whereas the latter does not.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)54-76
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
Issue number11-12
StatePublished - 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Imprint Academic. All rights reserved.


  • consciousness
  • judgments
  • method of phenomenal contrast
  • perceptual awareness
  • perceptual phenomenol-ogy
  • representationalism
  • resemblance
  • visual attention
  • visual experience
  • visual resemblance


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