TY - JOUR

T1 - Hotelling games in fault-prone settings

AU - Avin, Chen

AU - Cohen, Avi

AU - Lotker, Zvi

AU - Peleg, David

N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2022/6/24

Y1 - 2022/6/24

N2 - The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies the Hotelling game in fault-prone settings. Two fault models are studied: line faults and player faults. The first model assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player's Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one to one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with some probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n≥3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.

AB - The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies the Hotelling game in fault-prone settings. Two fault models are studied: line faults and player faults. The first model assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player's Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one to one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with some probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n≥3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.

KW - Competitive location problems

KW - Fault-prone settings

KW - Hotelling game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85128530720&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.tcs.2022.04.013

DO - 10.1016/j.tcs.2022.04.013

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:85128530720

SN - 0304-3975

VL - 922

SP - 96

EP - 107

JO - Theoretical Computer Science

JF - Theoretical Computer Science

ER -