Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs

Jonathan Katz; Yehuda Lindell

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_8

Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs

Jonathan Katz
, Yehuda Lindell

Department of Computer Science

University of Maryland, College Park

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines (or circuits). However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only simulation techniques known run in expected (and not strict) polynomial-time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is essential for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in the context of simulation-based security proofs.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Theory of Cryptography - Second Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	128-149
Number of pages	22
ISBN (Electronic)	3540245731
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_8
State	Published - 2005
Event	2nd Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005 - Cambridge, MA, United States Duration: 10 Feb 2005 → 12 Feb 2005

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	3378
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743

Conference

Conference	2nd Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005
Country/Territory	United States
City	Cambridge, MA
Period	10/02/05 → 12/02/05

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_8

Cite this

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title = "Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs",

abstract = "The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines (or circuits). However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only simulation techniques known run in expected (and not strict) polynomial-time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is essential for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in the context of simulation-based security proofs.",

author = "Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell",

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Katz, J & Lindell, Y 2005, Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs. in Theory of Cryptography - Second Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3378, Springer Verlag, pp. 128-149, 2nd Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005, Cambridge, MA, United States, 10/02/05. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_8

Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs. / Katz, Jonathan; Lindell, Yehuda.
Theory of Cryptography - Second Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2005. Springer Verlag, 2005. p. 128-149 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 3378).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs

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Conference

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