Global Antitakeover Devices

Kobi Kastiel, Adi Libson

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This Article explores a "hidden " mechanism that insulates management from hostile takeovers and activist intervention: The global antitakeover device ("GAD"). A GAD is based on the ability of public firms to "mix and match" between different forms of regulation by cross-listing on multiple stock exchanges or incorporating in foreign jurisdictions. This action subjects any hostile engagement with these firms to multiple jurisdictions' regulatory frameworks and creates regulatory barriers, complexity, and uncertainty. This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of these GADs, the costs they generate to potential bidders, and the unique features they possess relative to traditional antitakeover devices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)117-164
Number of pages48
JournalYale journal on regulation
Volume36
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Yale Journal on Regulation. All rights reserved.

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