Generalized Pseudorandom Secret Sharing and Efficient Straggler-Resilient Secure Computation

Fabrice Benhamouda, Elette Boyle, Niv Gilboa, Shai Halevi, Yuval Ishai, Ariel Nof

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) enables n parties, of which up to t may be corrupted, to perform joint computations on their private inputs while revealing only the outputs. Optimizing the asymptotic and concrete costs of MPC protocols has become an important line of research. Much of this research focuses on the setting of an honest majority, where n≥ 2 t+ 1, which gives rise to concretely efficient protocols that are either information-theoretic or make a black-box use of symmetric cryptography. Efficiency can be further improved in the case of a strong honest majority, where n> 2 t+ 1. Motivated by the goal of minimizing the communication and latency costs of MPC with a strong honest majority, we make two related contributions. Generalized pseudorandom secret sharing (PRSS). Linear correlations serve as an important resource for MPC protocols and beyond. PRSS enables secure generation of many pseudorandom instances of such correlations without interaction, given replicated seeds of a pseudorandom function. We extend the PRSS technique of Cramer et al. (TCC 2005) for sharing degree-d polynomials to new constructions leveraging a particular class of combinatorial designs. Our constructions yield a dramatic efficiency improvement when the degree d is higher than the security threshold t, not only for standard degree-d correlations but also for several useful generalizations. In particular, correlations for locally converting between slot configurations in “share packing” enable us to avoid the concrete overhead of prior works.Cheap straggler resilience. In reality, communication is not fully synchronous: protocol executions suffer from variance in communication delays and occasional node or message-delivery failures. We explore the benefits of PRSS-based MPC with a strong honest majority toward robustness against such failures, in turn yielding improved latency delays. In doing so we develop a novel technique for defending against a subtle “double-dipping” attack, which applies to the best existing protocols, with almost no extra cost in communication or rounds. Combining the above tools requires further work, including new methods for batch verification via distributed zero-knowledge proofs (Boneh et al., CRYPTO 2019) that apply to packed secret sharing. Overall, our work demonstrates new advantages of the strong honest majority setting, and introduces new tools—in particular, generalized PRSS—that we believe will be of independent use within other cryptographic applications.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 19th International Conference, TCC 2021, Proceedings
EditorsKobbi Nissim, Brent Waters, Brent Waters
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages129-161
Number of pages33
ISBN (Print)9783030904524
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021
Event19th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2021 - Raleigh, United States
Duration: 8 Nov 202111 Nov 2021

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume13043 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference19th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2021
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityRaleigh
Period8/11/2111/11/21

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, International Association for Cryptologic Research.

Funding

Acknowledgements. We thank Tuvi Etzion for helpful pointers to the literature on covering designs. E. Boyle supported by ISF grant 1861/16, AFOSR Award FA9550-17–1–0069, and ERC Project HSS (852952). N. Gilboa supported by ISF grant 2951/20, ERC grant 876110, and a grant by the BGU Cyber Center. Y. Ishai supported by ERC Project NTSC (742754), NSF-BSF grant 2015782, BSF grant 2018393, and ISF grant 2774/20. A. Nof supported by ERC Project NTSC (742754).

FundersFunder number
NSF-BSF2015782
NTSC742754
Air Force Office of Scientific ResearchFA9550-17–1–0069
Bonfils-Stanton Foundation2018393, 2774/20
Bishop Grosseteste University
Hospital for Special Surgery852952, 876110, 2951/20
Engineering Research Centers
Israel Science Foundation1861/16

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