Abstract
We revisit the question of the overhead to achieve full security (i.e., guaranteed output delivery) in secure multiparty computation (MPC). Recent works have closed the gap between full security and semi-honest security, by introducing protocols where the parties first compute the circuit using a semi-honest protocol and then run a verification step with sublinear communication in the circuit size. However, in these works the number of interaction rounds in the verification step is also sublinear in the circuit’s size. Unlike communication, the round complexity of the semi-honest execution typically grows with the circuit’s depth and not its size. Hence, for large but shallow circuits, this additional number of rounds incurs a significant overhead. Motivated by this gap, we make the following contributions: We present a new MPC framework to obtain full security, compatible with effectively any ring, that has an additive communication overhead of only O(log|C|), where |C| is the number of multiplication gates in the circuit, and a constant number of additional rounds beyond the underlying semi-honest protocol. Our framework works with any linear secret sharing scheme and relies on a new to utilize the machinery of zero-knowledge fully linear interactive oracle proofs (zk-FLIOP) in a black-box way. We present several instantiations to the building blocks of our compiler, from which we derive concretely efficient protocols in different settings.We present extensions to the zk-FLIOP primitive for very general settings. The first one is for proving statements over potentially non-commutative rings, where the only requirement is that the ring has a large enough set where (1) every element in the set commutes with every element in the ring, and (2) the difference between any two distinct elements is invertible. Our second zk-FLIOP extension is for proving statements over Galois Rings. For these rings, we present concrete improvements on the current state-of-the-art for the case of constant-round proofs, by making use of Reverse Multiplication Friendly Embeddings (RMFEs). We present a new MPC framework to obtain full security, compatible with effectively any ring, that has an additive communication overhead of only O(log|C|), where |C| is the number of multiplication gates in the circuit, and a constant number of additional rounds beyond the underlying semi-honest protocol. Our framework works with any linear secret sharing scheme and relies on a new to utilize the machinery of zero-knowledge fully linear interactive oracle proofs (zk-FLIOP) in a black-box way. We present several instantiations to the building blocks of our compiler, from which we derive concretely efficient protocols in different settings. We present extensions to the zk-FLIOP primitive for very general settings. The first one is for proving statements over potentially non-commutative rings, where the only requirement is that the ring has a large enough set where (1) every element in the set commutes with every element in the ring, and (2) the difference between any two distinct elements is invertible. Our second zk-FLIOP extension is for proving statements over Galois Rings. For these rings, we present concrete improvements on the current state-of-the-art for the case of constant-round proofs, by making use of Reverse Multiplication Friendly Embeddings (RMFEs).
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2024 - 44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings |
Editors | Leonid Reyzin, Douglas Stebila |
Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH |
Pages | 136-169 |
Number of pages | 34 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783031683961 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2024 |
Event | 44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2024 - Santa Barbara, United States Duration: 18 Aug 2024 → 22 Aug 2024 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
---|---|
Volume | 14927 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2024 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | United States |
City | Santa Barbara |
Period | 18/08/24 → 22/08/24 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2024.