Abstract
We consider the problem of computing effective coalition structures in situations where the coalitions that can be formed and the value of these coalitions is determined by a social network, indicating the strength of relationships between agents. We assume that a central organizer desires to build coalition structures to carry out a given set of tasks, and that it is possible for this central organizer to create new relationships between agents, although such relationship-building is assumed to incur some cost. Within this model, we investigate the problem of computing coalition structures that maximize social welfare, and the problem of computing core-stable coalition structures. In addition to giving some general results on these problems, we identify tractable instances of the problems, and present algorithms for these cases.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 261-268 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781634391313 |
| State | Published - 2014 |
| Event | 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 - Paris, France Duration: 5 May 2014 → 9 May 2014 |
Publication series
| Name | 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 |
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| Volume | 1 |
Conference
| Conference | 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 |
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| Country/Territory | France |
| City | Paris |
| Period | 5/05/14 → 9/05/14 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © 2014, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Additively separable hedonic games
- Coalition formation
- Social networks