First-Time Interaction Under Revenue-Sharing Contract and Asymmetric Beliefs of Supply-Chain Members

Tatyana Chernonog

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_18

First-Time Interaction Under Revenue-Sharing Contract and Asymmetric Beliefs of Supply-Chain Members

Tatyana Chernonog

Department of Management

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

The paper provides a thorough investigation of a first-time interaction between a retailer and a manufacturer who are unreliable in a cost function of the manufacturer. We consider a two-echelon supply chain of a single customized product, where parties interact via a revenue-sharing contract. The general model is formulated as a Retailer-Stackelberg game with two-sided information asymmetry. We derive the equilibrium strategy and parties’ profits when: (i) information is complete, (ii) hidden information asymmetry is present, and (iii) known information asymmetry is present. For a third scenario, we propose two different contracts to induce a Pareto-optimal information-sharing equilibrium.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	AIRO Springer Series
Publisher	Springer Nature
Pages	161-168
Number of pages	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_18
State	Published - 2018

Publication series

Name	AIRO Springer Series
Volume	1
ISSN (Print)	2523-7047
ISSN (Electronic)	2523-7055

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

Asymmetric information
Revenue sharing contract
Supply chain management

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_18

Cite this

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First-Time Interaction Under Revenue-Sharing Contract and Asymmetric Beliefs of Supply-Chain Members

Abstract

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Keywords

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