Abstract
Zero-Knowledge protocols have increasingly become both popular and practical in recent years due to their applicability in many areas such as blockchain systems. Unfortunately, public verifiability and small proof sizes of zero-knowledge protocols currently come at the price of strong assumptions, large prover time, or both, when considering statements with millions of gates. In this regime, the most prover-efficient protocols are in the designated verifier setting, where proofs are only valid to a single party that must keep a secret state. In this work, we bridge this gap between designated-verifier proofs and public verifiability by distributing the verifier efficiently. Here, a set of verifiers can then verify a proof and, if a given threshold t of the n verifiers is honest and trusted, can act as guarantors for the validity of a statement. We achieve this while keeping the concrete efficiency of current designated-verifier proofs, and present constructions that have small concrete computation and communication cost. We present practical protocols in the setting of threshold verifiers with t<n/4 and t<n/3, for which we give performance figures, showcasing the efficiency of our approach.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | CCS 2022 - Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
Pages | 293-306 |
Number of pages | 14 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450394505 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 7 Nov 2022 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 28th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2022 - Los Angeles, United States Duration: 7 Nov 2022 → 11 Nov 2022 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
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ISSN (Print) | 1543-7221 |
Conference
Conference | 28th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2022 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Los Angeles |
Period | 7/11/22 → 11/11/22 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2022 Owner/Author.
Funding
We thank Pratik Sarkar for identifying a bug in an earlier version. This work has been supported in part by ERC Advanced Grant ERC-2015-AdG-IMPaCT, by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under contract HR001120C0085, by the FWO under an Odysseus project GOH9718N, by CyberSecurity Research Flanders with reference number VR20192203, by the Aarhus University Research Foundation, and by the Independent Research Fund Denmark under project number 0165-00107B.
Funders | Funder number |
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CyberSecurity Research Flanders | VR20192203 |
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | HR001120C0085 |
Aarhus Universitets Forskningsfond | |
Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek | GOH9718N |
Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond | 0165-00107B |
Keywords
- multi-party computation
- threshold cryptography
- zero-knowledge proofs