Fault-tolerant hotelling games

Chen Avin, Avi Cohen, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies fault-tolerant versions of the Hotelling game. Two fault models are studied. The first assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player’s Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one-to-one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with i.i.d. probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n ≥ 3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing
ISSN (Print)2522-8595
ISSN (Electronic)2522-8609

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019.


  • Hotelling Game
  • Inside Service
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Peripheral Services
  • Voronoi Cell


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