Families, Markets, and Self-Enforcing Reciprocity Norms

J. Guttman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper studies the evolution of self-enforcing reciprocity norms in a developing economy with weak property rights. In the model, children are viewed as investments in old-age support. In order to increase support in their old age, parents attempt to instill preferences for reciprocity in their children. These educational investments create a nucleus of "reciprocators", inducing the remaining opportunistic types to mimic the reciprocators' behavior, in order to find partners in their market transaction
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)89-110
JournalEconomie & statistique
StatePublished - 2001


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