Endemic corruption

  • Nava Kahana
  • , Liu Qijun

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    50 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    We draw on the background of regional and local governments in China to identify the source of endemic corruption in the behavior of officials in government bureaucracies. When personal advancement in a bureaucracy involves payment of bribes to superiors, corruption is the consequence of the need to finance the bribes. In order to pay the bribes, government officials need to receive bribes, which are sought from subordinates in the government bureaucracy and from private individuals. All individuals are not, of course, equally corrupt or corruptible and merit is also a basis for advancement. However, corruption is endemic if the heads of government bureaucracies are corrupt in the procedures and criteria for personal advancement in the government bureaucracy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)82-88
    Number of pages7
    JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
    Volume26
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2010

    Bibliographical note

    Funding Information:
    The authors thank Arye L. Hillman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Kahana acknowledges the financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University.

    Funding

    The authors thank Arye L. Hillman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Kahana acknowledges the financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University.

    Funders
    Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University

      Keywords

      • Bribes
      • Bureaucracy
      • Corruption
      • Hierarchies
      • Promotion
      • Rent extraction

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