Endemic corruption

Nava Kahana, Liu Qijun

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

We draw on the background of regional and local governments in China to identify the source of endemic corruption in the behavior of officials in government bureaucracies. When personal advancement in a bureaucracy involves payment of bribes to superiors, corruption is the consequence of the need to finance the bribes. In order to pay the bribes, government officials need to receive bribes, which are sought from subordinates in the government bureaucracy and from private individuals. All individuals are not, of course, equally corrupt or corruptible and merit is also a basis for advancement. However, corruption is endemic if the heads of government bureaucracies are corrupt in the procedures and criteria for personal advancement in the government bureaucracy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)82-88
Number of pages7
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2010

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors thank Arye L. Hillman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Kahana acknowledges the financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University.

Funding

The authors thank Arye L. Hillman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Kahana acknowledges the financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University.

FundersFunder number
Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University

    Keywords

    • Bribes
    • Bureaucracy
    • Corruption
    • Hierarchies
    • Promotion
    • Rent extraction

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Endemic corruption'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this