Abstract
This paper provides unexpected support to Nash's view of how bargaining determines the social choice. We first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters' preferences and their choice probabilities. The outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a Nash-type social welfare function (theorem 1). This electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum (corollary 1). Within our framework, existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed (corollaries 2 and 3).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 113-121 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 1981 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:assistance provided by the National Science Foundation. We helpful comments and suggestions from the participants in the Theory Seminar, the Hebrew University Economic Theory Elections Session at the 1979 Public Choice Society Meeting, as Bezalel Peleg, Micha Perles, and Ariel Rubinstein.
Funding
assistance provided by the National Science Foundation. We helpful comments and suggestions from the participants in the Theory Seminar, the Hebrew University Economic Theory Elections Session at the 1979 Public Choice Society Meeting, as Bezalel Peleg, Micha Perles, and Ariel Rubinstein.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| National Science Foundation |