Abstract
In this paper, we construct efficient secure protocols for set intersection and pattern matching. Our protocols for secure computing the set intersection functionality are based on secure pseudorandom function evaluations, in contrast to previous protocols that are based on polynomials. In addition to the above, we also use secure pseudorandom function evaluation in order to achieve secure pattern matching. In this case, we utilize specific properties of the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function in order to achieve high efficiency. Our results are presented in two adversary models. Our protocol for secure pattern matching and one of our protocols for set intersection achieve security against malicious adversaries under a relaxed definition where one corruption case is simulatable and, for the other, only privacy (formalized through indistinguishability) is guaranteed. We also present a protocol for set intersection that is fully simulatable in the model of covert adversaries. Loosely speaking, this means that a malicious adversary can cheat but will then be caught with good probability.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 422-456 |
Number of pages | 35 |
Journal | Journal of Cryptology |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2010 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:An extended abstract of this paper appeared in TCC 2008. The research was supported by an Eshkol scholarship and Infrastructures grant from the Israel Ministry of Science and Technology.
Keywords
- Oblivious pseudorandom function
- Pattern matching and set intersection