Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and covert adversaries

Carmit Hazay; Yehuda Lindell

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_10

Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and covert adversaries

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

215 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we construct efficient secure protocols for set intersection and pattern matching. Our protocols for securely computing the set intersection functionality are based on secure pseudorandom function evaluations, in contrast to previous protocols that used secure polynomial evaluation. In addition to the above, we also use secure pseudorandom function evaluation in order to achieve secure pattern matching. In this case, we utilize specific properties of the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function in order to achieve high efficiency. Our results are presented in two adversary models. Our protocol for secure pattern matching and one of our protocols for set intersection achieve security against malicious adversaries under a relaxed definition where one corruption case is simulatable and for the other only privacy (formalized through indistinguishability) is guaranteed. We also present a protocol for set intersection that is fully simulatable in the model of covert adversaries. Loosely speaking, this means that a malicious adversary can cheat, but will then be caught with good probability.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Theory of Cryptography
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	155-175
Number of pages	21
ISBN (Print)	354078523X, 9783540785231
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_10
State	Published - 2008
Event	5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2008 - New York, United States Duration: 19 Mar 2008 → 21 Mar 2008

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	4948 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2008
Country/Territory	United States
City	New York
Period	19/03/08 → 21/03/08

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This research was supported by an Eshkol scholarship and Infrastructures grant from the Israel Ministry of Science and Technology.

Funding

This research was supported by an Eshkol scholarship and Infrastructures grant from the Israel Ministry of Science and Technology.

Funders
Eshkol scholarship and Infrastructures
Ministry of science and technology, Israel

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_10

Cite this

Hazay, C., & Lindell, Y. (2008). Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and covert adversaries. In Theory of Cryptography (pp. 155-175). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4948 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_10

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abstract = "In this paper we construct efficient secure protocols for set intersection and pattern matching. Our protocols for securely computing the set intersection functionality are based on secure pseudorandom function evaluations, in contrast to previous protocols that used secure polynomial evaluation. In addition to the above, we also use secure pseudorandom function evaluation in order to achieve secure pattern matching. In this case, we utilize specific properties of the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function in order to achieve high efficiency. Our results are presented in two adversary models. Our protocol for secure pattern matching and one of our protocols for set intersection achieve security against malicious adversaries under a relaxed definition where one corruption case is simulatable and for the other only privacy (formalized through indistinguishability) is guaranteed. We also present a protocol for set intersection that is fully simulatable in the model of covert adversaries. Loosely speaking, this means that a malicious adversary can cheat, but will then be caught with good probability.",

author = "Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell",

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Hazay, C & Lindell, Y 2008, Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and covert adversaries. in Theory of Cryptography. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4948 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 155-175, 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2008, New York, United States, 19/03/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_10

Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and covert adversaries. / Hazay, Carmit ; Lindell, Yehuda.
Theory of Cryptography. Springer Verlag, 2008. p. 155-175 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4948 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and covert adversaries

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