In this paper we construct efficient secure protocols for set intersection and pattern matching. Our protocols for securely computing the set intersection functionality are based on secure pseudorandom function evaluations, in contrast to previous protocols that used secure polynomial evaluation. In addition to the above, we also use secure pseudorandom function evaluation in order to achieve secure pattern matching. In this case, we utilize specific properties of the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function in order to achieve high efficiency. Our results are presented in two adversary models. Our protocol for secure pattern matching and one of our protocols for set intersection achieve security against malicious adversaries under a relaxed definition where one corruption case is simulatable and for the other only privacy (formalized through indistinguishability) is guaranteed. We also present a protocol for set intersection that is fully simulatable in the model of covert adversaries. Loosely speaking, this means that a malicious adversary can cheat, but will then be caught with good probability.
|Title of host publication||Theory of Cryptography - Fifth Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2008, Proceedings|
|Number of pages||21|
|State||Published - 2008|
|Event||5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2008 - New York, United States|
Duration: 19 Mar 2008 → 21 Mar 2008
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2008|
|Period||19/03/08 → 21/03/08|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This research was supported by an Eshkol scholarship and Infrastructures grant from the Israel Ministry of Science and Technology.