Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods

Chaim Fershtman, Shmuel Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

111 Scopus citations


The paper considers a dynamic public goods problem in which individuals' contributions are accumulated over time. Analyzing the infinite duration dynamic game with continuous contributions and flow benefits, the paper demonstrates that the free riding problem is aggravated when players' contributions are conditional on the observable collective contributions. Hence, without commitment, an additional incentive to depress contributions arises; a current contributor can free ride on all future contributions as well as on current ones.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1057-1067
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Issue number5
StatePublished - Jul 1991


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