TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods
AU - Fershtman, Chaim
AU - Nitzan, Shmuel
PY - 1991/7
Y1 - 1991/7
N2 - The paper considers a dynamic public goods problem in which individuals' contributions are accumulated over time. Analyzing the infinite duration dynamic game with continuous contributions and flow benefits, the paper demonstrates that the free riding problem is aggravated when players' contributions are conditional on the observable collective contributions. Hence, without commitment, an additional incentive to depress contributions arises; a current contributor can free ride on all future contributions as well as on current ones.
AB - The paper considers a dynamic public goods problem in which individuals' contributions are accumulated over time. Analyzing the infinite duration dynamic game with continuous contributions and flow benefits, the paper demonstrates that the free riding problem is aggravated when players' contributions are conditional on the observable collective contributions. Hence, without commitment, an additional incentive to depress contributions arises; a current contributor can free ride on all future contributions as well as on current ones.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0001721431&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0014-2921(91)90004-3
DO - 10.1016/0014-2921(91)90004-3
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AN - SCOPUS:0001721431
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 35
SP - 1057
EP - 1067
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
IS - 5
ER -