Embedding sensors on wireless devices for collaborative environment sensing has been envisioned as a cost-effective solution for IoT applications. However, existing IoT platforms faces challenges, e.g., unsustainablility due to the limited on-device battery and tremendous cost of deploying middlewares for centralized task dispatching. In this paper, we employ wireless energy transfer and permissionless blockchains to construct a sustainable and decentralized IoT crowdsensing platform. Therein, IoT sensing cloud composed of multiple co-located sensors is wirelessly powered by RF-energy beacons for data sensing and transmission. The data is then forwarded to the blockchain for distributed data/transaction verification and trading. The data users access the crowdsensing service by renting sensors from the sensing clouds. Both the sensing clouds and data users are self-interested and aim to maximize their individual profits. The sensing clouds handle the interference of concurrent wireless transmissions and the on-chain transaction cost. Meanwhile, each user distributes its limited budget over the sensing clouds to optimize the service quality. We formulate a Stackelberg differential game to analyze the interaction among the sensing clouds and data users. Then, we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium by capitalizing on Pontryagin's maximum principle. Furthermore, we provide a series of insightful numerical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium.
|Title of host publication||2019 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2019|
|Publisher||Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.|
|State||Published - Apr 2019|
|Event||2019 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2019 - Marrakesh, Morocco|
Duration: 15 Apr 2019 → 19 Apr 2019
|Name||IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC|
|Conference||2019 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2019|
|Period||15/04/19 → 19/04/19|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) Grant funded by the Korean Government under Grant 2014R1A5A1011478, WASP/NTU M4082187 (4080), Singapore MOE Tier 1 under Grant 2017-T1-002-007 RG122/17, MOE Tier 2 under Grant MOE2014-T2-2-015 ARC4/15, NRF2015-NRF-ISF001-2277, and EMA Energy Resilience under Grant NRF2017EWT-EP003-041.
© 2019 IEEE.
- Stackelberg differential game
- energy harvesting
- evolutionary game