Double auctions in markets for multiple kinds of goods

Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when market sizes of all goods grow to ∞ at a similar rate.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
EditorsJerome Lang
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages489-497
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241127
DOIs
StatePublished - 2018
Event27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
Duration: 13 Jul 201819 Jul 2018

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2018-July
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
Country/TerritorySweden
CityStockholm
Period13/07/1819/07/18

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. All right reserved.

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