Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

M. Abudy, Dan Amiram, Oded Rozenbaum, Efrat Shust

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Original language	American English
State	Published - 2019
Event	European Accounting Association 42nd conference - EAA, Phapus, Cyprus Duration: 5 May 2019 → 16 May 2019 http://www.eaa-online.org/r/Annual_Congress (Website)

Conference	European Accounting Association 42nd conference
Country/Territory	Cyprus
City	Phapus
Period	5/05/19 → 16/05/19
Internet address	http://www.eaa-online.org/r/Annual_Congress (Website)

Cite this

@conference{c00873e0807e4c7e814532e1b62b3d81,

title = "Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment",

author = "M. Abudy and Dan Amiram and Oded Rozenbaum and Efrat Shust",

year = "2019",

language = "American English",

note = "European Accounting Association 42nd conference ; Conference date: 05-05-2019 Through 16-05-2019",

url = "http://www.eaa-online.org/r/Annual_Congress",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

AU - Abudy, M.

AU - Amiram, Dan

AU - Rozenbaum, Oded

AU - Shust, Efrat

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

UR - https://en-coller.tau.ac.il/sites/coller-english.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/Recanati/management/conferences/accounting/2017/AARS05312017.pdf

M3 - Paper

T2 - European Accounting Association 42nd conference

Y2 - 5 May 2019 through 16 May 2019

ER -