Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting

Peter Coughlin; Shmuel Nitzan

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(81)90056-9

Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting

Peter Coughlin, Shmuel Nitzan

Stanford University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

52 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper develops the foundations of spatial models of electoral competitions with probabilistic voting from the existing literature on this topic. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions for: (1) directional electoral equilibria; (2) stationary electoral equilibria; and (3) local electoral equilibria. These conditions imply general existence results for such equilibria. These results are derived without using any special concavity conditions or symmetry assumptions on the distribution of voters' preferences. Additionally, they hold for any multi-dimensional policy space. This is in marked contrast to the existing results on electoral equilibria in spatial models with deterministic or probabilistic voting. The conditions derived in this paper also reveal the equivalence between elections and certain social choice mechanisms involving the social log-likelihood function. (Author)

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	226-239
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	24
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90056-9
State	Published - Apr 1981
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation and by Offtce of Naval Research’ Grant No. ONR-NOOOl4-79-C-0685. An earlier version was released as Technical Report No. 303 in the Economics Series of the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences at Stanford University. ’ Current address: Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford University, Oxford, En land.

Funding

* This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation and by Offtce of Naval Research’ Grant No. ONR-NOOOl4-79-C-0685. An earlier version was released as Technical Report No. 303 in the Economics Series of the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences at Stanford University. ’ Current address: Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford University, Oxford, En land.

Funders	Funder number
Offtce of Naval Research
National Science Foundation

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10.1016/0022-0531(81)90056-9

Cite this

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title = "Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting",

abstract = "This paper develops the foundations of spatial models of electoral competitions with probabilistic voting from the existing literature on this topic. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions for: (1) directional electoral equilibria; (2) stationary electoral equilibria; and (3) local electoral equilibria. These conditions imply general existence results for such equilibria. These results are derived without using any special concavity conditions or symmetry assumptions on the distribution of voters' preferences. Additionally, they hold for any multi-dimensional policy space. This is in marked contrast to the existing results on electoral equilibria in spatial models with deterministic or probabilistic voting. The conditions derived in this paper also reveal the equivalence between elections and certain social choice mechanisms involving the social log-likelihood function. (Author)",

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Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting

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