Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game

Yael Deutsch; Boaz Golany; Uriel G. Rothblum

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.054

Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game

Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany, Uriel G. Rothblum

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper addresses a "game" between an inspection agency and multiple inspectees that are subject to random inspections by that agency. We provide explicit (easily computable) expressions for all possible Nash equilibria and verify that none is left out. In particular, our results characterize situations when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We also explore special features of the Nash equilibria and the solution of the problem the inspection agency faces in a non-strategic environment.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	422-430
Number of pages	9
Journal	European Journal of Operational Research
Volume	215
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.054
State	Published - 1 Dec 2011
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This research was partially supported by the Daniel Rose Technion-Yale Initiative for Research on Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism.

Funding

This research was partially supported by the Daniel Rose Technion-Yale Initiative for Research on Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism.

Funders	Funder number
Counter-Terrorism
Daniel Rose Technion-Yale Initiative for Research on Homeland Security

Keywords

Game theory
Inspection games
Nash equilibria
Resource allocation

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10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.054

Cite this

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Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

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