Demystifying the 'metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'

Shmuel Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Saari (Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes, 2008) well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. This note illustrates the relevance of these explanations in justifying the 'metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion'.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)25-28
Number of pages4
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume35
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2010

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