TY - GEN
T1 - Delegating decisions in strategic settings
AU - Kraus, Sarit
AU - Wooldridge, Michael
N1 - Place of conference:France
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - We formalise and investigate the following problem. A principal must delegate a number of decisions to a collection of agents. Once the decisions are delegated, the agents to whom the decisions are delegated will act selfishly, rationally, and independently in pursuit of their own preferences. The principal himself is assumed to be self-interested, and has some goal that he desires to be achieved. The delegation problem is then, given such a setting, is it possible for the principal to delegate decisions in such a way that, if all the agents to whom decisions have been delegated then make decisions rationally, the principal's goal will be achieved in equilibrium. We formalise this problem using Boolean games, which provides a very natural framework within which to capture the delegation problem: decisions are directly represented as Boolean variables, which the principal assigns to agents. After motivating and formally defining the delegation problem, we investigate the computational complexity of the problem, and some issues surrounding it.
AB - We formalise and investigate the following problem. A principal must delegate a number of decisions to a collection of agents. Once the decisions are delegated, the agents to whom the decisions are delegated will act selfishly, rationally, and independently in pursuit of their own preferences. The principal himself is assumed to be self-interested, and has some goal that he desires to be achieved. The delegation problem is then, given such a setting, is it possible for the principal to delegate decisions in such a way that, if all the agents to whom decisions have been delegated then make decisions rationally, the principal's goal will be achieved in equilibrium. We formalise this problem using Boolean games, which provides a very natural framework within which to capture the delegation problem: decisions are directly represented as Boolean variables, which the principal assigns to agents. After motivating and formally defining the delegation problem, we investigate the computational complexity of the problem, and some issues surrounding it.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84878786190&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-468
DO - 10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-468
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AN - SCOPUS:84878786190
SN - 9781614990970
T3 - Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
SP - 468
EP - 473
BT - ECAI 2012 - 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 27-31 August 2012, Montpellier, France - Including Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence (PAIS-2012) System Demonstration
PB - IOS Press BV
T2 - 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2012
Y2 - 27 August 2012 through 31 August 2012
ER -