Abstract
When the Intifada broke out in September 2000, the situation was one of asymmetry and contiguity between the two sides: modes of control exercised by Israel included the stationing of Israeli troops deep within areas of Palestinian rule and the encirclement of Palestinian cities by Israeli army bases. This article asks whether, in light of this situation, the Palestinian leadership and other Palestinian groups at any point developed a clear strategy for military action, and examines the consequences of any strategy, or lack of one, for the outcome of the confrontation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 61-80 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Terrorism and Political Violence |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2003 |
RAMBI Publications
- RAMBI Publications
- Palestinian National Authority
- Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000-2005
- Arab-Israeli conflict -- 21st century
- Palestinian Arabs -- West Bank and Gaza Strip
- Israel -- Defenses -- History -- 21st century