Abstract
First-order and high-order correlation-power-analysis attacks have been shown to be a severe threat to cryptographic devices. As such, they serve as a security measure for evaluation and comparison of security-oriented implementations. When properly designed, data-dependent delays can be used as a barrier to these attacks. This paper introduces a security-oriented delay assignment algorithm for mitigating single and multibit attacks. The algorithm enables a reduction of the correlation between the processed data and the consumed current by utilizing the data-dependent delays as a source of correlated noise. This is done while minimizing the area overhead, propagation time, and power. We show that for the same security level this new algorithm provides X2 and X6 more area efficiency, and X1.5 and X2.25 higher frequencies than a permuted path delay assignment and random embedding of delay elements.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 7527634 |
Pages (from-to) | 608-620 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2016 IEEE.
Funding
The work of O. Keren was supported by the Israel Science Foundation under Grant 1200/12.
Funders | Funder number |
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Israel Science Foundation | 1200/12 |
Keywords
- Correlation power analysis (CPA)
- Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
- Power analysis
- countermeasures
- cryptography
- data dependency
- data-dependent delays
- intracycle