Covert adversaries

Carmit Hazay; Yehuda Lindell

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_5

Covert adversaries

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

In this chapter, we present protocols for securely computing any functionality in the model of covert adversaries; see Section 2.4 for motivation and definitions of the model. We begin by presenting a protocol for oblivious transfer that is secure in the covert model. We present this protocol mainly for didactic reasons; it serves as a good warm-up for understanding how to prove security in this model. Nevertheless, we stress that more efficient oblivious transfer protocols are known (both for the covert and malicious settings; see Section 7.4 for an example).

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security and Cryptography
Publisher	Springer International Publishing
Pages	109-143
Number of pages	35
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_5
State	Published - 2010

Publication series

Name	Information Security and Cryptography
Volume	15
ISSN (Print)	1619-7100
ISSN (Electronic)	2197-845X

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2010, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_5

Cite this

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Covert adversaries

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