Costly Nash paths

Yakar Kannai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Maschler, Owen, and Peleg (in: The Shapley Value, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988, pp. 321-330) suggested a dynamic system leading to the Nash bargaining set. Here we modify their system by introducing cost in the form of extra participants. The new dynamics is defined on an n + m dimensional bargaining set. We analyze the effect of cost on the final outcome both in general and in several particular cases.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)171-180
Number of pages10
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume45
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2003
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Yakar Kannai is Erica and Ludwig Jesselson Professor of Theoretical Mathematics. This research was partly supported by a MINERVA Foundation (Germany) grant. Work on this note started while the author was visiting Germany. I am indebted to K. Hildenbrand, W. Güth, the participants of the Bielefeld Mathematical Economics seminar, and an anonymous referee, for helpful suggestions.

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