Abstract
Maschler, Owen, and Peleg (in: The Shapley Value, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988, pp. 321-330) suggested a dynamic system leading to the Nash bargaining set. Here we modify their system by introducing cost in the form of extra participants. The new dynamics is defined on an n + m dimensional bargaining set. We analyze the effect of cost on the final outcome both in general and in several particular cases.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 171-180 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Yakar Kannai is Erica and Ludwig Jesselson Professor of Theoretical Mathematics. This research was partly supported by a MINERVA Foundation (Germany) grant. Work on this note started while the author was visiting Germany. I am indebted to K. Hildenbrand, W. Güth, the participants of the Bielefeld Mathematical Economics seminar, and an anonymous referee, for helpful suggestions.
Funding
Yakar Kannai is Erica and Ludwig Jesselson Professor of Theoretical Mathematics. This research was partly supported by a MINERVA Foundation (Germany) grant. Work on this note started while the author was visiting Germany. I am indebted to K. Hildenbrand, W. Güth, the participants of the Bielefeld Mathematical Economics seminar, and an anonymous referee, for helpful suggestions.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Minerva Foundation |