Costly expressive voting

Arthur Fishman, Doron Klunover

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We incorporate expressive utility into Börgers’ (2004) canonical symmetric model of costly voting. It is shown that, under reasonable conditions, there exist two types of Bayesian Equilibria, those in which voters vote instrumentally and those in which they vote expressively. We show that equilibria in which voting is expressive is characterized by higher turnout and higher welfare. It is also shown that, in contrast to Borgers, when voting is expressive, turnout is too low.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)99-104
Number of pages6
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
StatePublished - Jan 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier B.V.


  • Costly voting
  • Expressive voting
  • Voter turnout
  • Voting paradox


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