Costly expressive voting

Arthur Fishman; Doron Klunover

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.003

Costly expressive voting

Arthur Fishman, Doron Klunover

Department of Economics

Industrial Engineering and Management Department

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We incorporate expressive utility into Börgers’ (2004) canonical symmetric model of costly voting. It is shown that, under reasonable conditions, there exist two types of Bayesian Equilibria, those in which voters vote instrumentally and those in which they vote expressively. We show that equilibria in which voting is expressive is characterized by higher turnout and higher welfare. It is also shown that, in contrast to Borgers, when voting is expressive, turnout is too low.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	99-104
Number of pages	6
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	127
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.003
State	Published - Jan 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier B.V.

Funding

We wish to thank two anonymous referees and an associate editor of this journal for their valuable comments and suggestions, which substantially improved the paper. All remaining errors are our own.

Keywords

Costly voting
Expressive voting
Voter turnout
Voting paradox

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.003

Cite this

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Costly expressive voting

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

Access to Document

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