Cooperative boolean games

P. E Dunne, W van der Hoek, S Kraus, M Wooldridge

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent's primary aim is to achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean variables. Each agent is assumed to exercise unique control over some subset of the overall set of Boolean variables, and the set of valuations for these variables corresponds to the set of actions the agent can take. However, the actions available to an agent are assumed to have some cost, and an agent's secondary aim is to minimise its costs. Typically, an agent must cooperate with others because it does not have sufficient control to ensure its goal is satisfied. However, the desire to minimise costs leads to preferences over possible coalitions, and hence to strategic behaviour. Following an introduction to the formal framework of Cooperative Boolean Games, we investigate solution concepts of the core and stable sets for them. In each case, we characterise the complexity of the associated solution concept, and discuss the surrounding issues. Finally, we present a bargaining protocol for cooperation in Boolean games, and characterise the strategies in equilibrium for this protocol.
Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publication7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
StatePublished - 2008

Bibliographical note

Place of conference:Portugal

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