Convergence of approximate best-response dynamics in interference games

Ilai Bistritz, Amir Leshem

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

5 Scopus citations


In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. In contrast to congestion games, interference games are generally not potential games. Therefore, proving the convergence of the best-response dynamics to a Nash equilibrium in these games requires new techniques. We suggest a model for random interference games, based on channel gains which are dictated by the random locations of the players. Our goal is to prove convergence of approximate best-response dynamics with high probability with respect to the randomized game. We embrace the asynchronous model in which the acting player is chosen at each stage at random. In our approximate best-response dynamics, the action of a deviating player is chosen at random among all the approximately best ones. We show that with high probability, asymptotically with the number of players, each action increases the expected social-welfare (sum of achievable rates). Hence, the induced sum-rate process is a submartingale. Based on the Martingale Convergence Theorem, we prove convergence of the strategy profile to an approximate Nash equilibrium with good performance for asymptotically almost all interference games. Finally, we demonstrate our results in simulated examples.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509018376
StatePublished - 27 Dec 2016
Event55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States
Duration: 12 Dec 201614 Dec 2016

Publication series

Name2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016


Conference55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityLas Vegas

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 IEEE.


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